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In this Article, Ms. Smith examines inter-jurisdictional certification
procedures by which federal courts obtain authoritative answers to
state law questions from a state's highest court. Exploring other
states' resolutions of common objections to certification
procedures, the author advocates that North Carolina adopt such a
procedure in order to avoid difficulties in federal courts applying
unsettled state law, to ensure state sovereignty over state
lawmaking, to foster comity between state and federal courts, and
to promote judicial economy.
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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina is one of only four states yet to adopt an inter-
jurisdictional certification procedure allowing federal courts to obtain
authoritative answers to doubtful questions of state law from the
state's highest court.' The utility of such a procedure is aptly
illustrated by an example from North Carolina case law in which the
federal courts grappled with the novel and unclear question of
whether North Carolina would recognize a new basis of liability in
automobile accident cases known as the "second impact" or
"enhanced injury" theory Under this theory, a plaintiff may obtain
recovery against an automobile manufacturer when defects in a
vehicle enhance or increase the plaintiffs injuries in an accident, even
though the defect did not cause the accident itself.
3
Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.4 was the first
federal case to address whether North Carolina would recognize the
second-impact doctrine. In that case, the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina predicted that the North
Carolina Supreme Court would reject the theory.' Five years later, in
Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales,6 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina disagreed.7 In 1977, the
Middle District weighed in, following Alexander and rejecting the
theory. In 1980, the issue again came before the Eastern District,
and following Isaacson, that court concluded that North Carolina
would adopt the second impact doctrine. One year later, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came to the opposite
conclusion.' In 1989, eighteen years after the first federal court
decision, the question finally came before the North Carolina Court
1. See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a list of states that have adopted
inter-jurisdictional certification procedures.
2. See Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 477-78 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Warren
v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 92, 94,377 S.E.2d 249,250 (1989).
3. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). Larsen is
the leading second impact doctrine case.
4. 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
5. See id. at 326-27.
6. 438 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
7. See id. at 6.
8. See Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445, 447 (M.D.N.C. 1977),
affd on other grounds, 588 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1978) (unpublished table decision).
9. See Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475,478-79 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
10. See Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see
also Erwin v. Jeep Corp., 812 F.2d 172, 173 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (following




of Appeals." Judge (now Justice) Orr held that a cause of action
based on the second impact theory was permissible under North
Carolina law.'2 The question has yet to be presented to the North
Carolina Supreme Court and thus yet to be definitively resolved. If
North Carolina had a certification procedure in place, the question
could have been settled some twenty-eight years ago, thus avoiding
the costs and inefficiencies associated with erroneous federal
decisionmaking.
By adopting an inter-jurisdictional certification procedure, the
state of North Carolina would provide a mechanism for avoiding the
difficulties and undesirable results associated with the federal courts'
"predictive approach" to deciding unsettled questions of state law. 3
Such a procedure also would ensure state sovereignty over state
lawmaking, foster comity between the state and federal courts, and
promote judicial economy. Finally, if carefully drafted, a certification
procedure would not run afoul of the North Carolina Constitution
and would not inundate the state court system with additional cases.
Part II of this Article traces the development of certification in
this country and generally describes the certification procedures in
place in other jurisdictions. Part III discusses the benefits of
certification, including avoiding prognostication by the federal courts,
promoting comity and federalism, and providing a quicker and
cheaper alternative to abstention. Part IV addresses the possible
objections to certification and argues that none justifies rejection of
the procedure. Part V concludes by suggesting that the State of
North Carolina should join the majority of states and adopt the
simple and efficient procedure of inter-jurisdictional certification.
I. EVOLUTION OF CERTIFICATION
Inter-jurisdictional certification is a procedure whereby a federal
court faced with an unclear question of state law may refer that
question to the relevant state high court for resolution. 4 Although
certification has a long history in English law,'5 inter-jurisdictional
11. See Warren v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 92, 96,377 S.E.2d 249,252 (1989).
12. See id. at 96, 377 S.E.2d at 252.
13. The phrase "predictive approach" is borrowed from Bradford R. Clark,
Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459,1461 (1997).
14. See ERWIN CHEMERENSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 711 (1994). The procedure
differs from abstention in that the litigants are not required to undertake an entirely
separate litigation at the bottom rung of the state judicial system. See id. at 710-11.
15. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW AcT, 12 U.L.A. 67 n.1 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 UNIF. Acr] (noting that the British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859
2125
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
certification did not make its debut in the United States until 1945,
when the State of Florida enacted the first certification statute.16 Ten
years later, Hawaii became the second state to adopt an inter-
jurisdictional certification procedure.'7 These procedures, however,
remained dormant until 1960, when the United States Supreme
Court, in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd..' extolled the Florida
legislature's "rare foresight" in enacting a certification statute. 9
In Clay, the plaintiff purchased an Illinois-made insurance policy
from the defendant, an insurance company.20 The policy provided for
worldwide coverage on certain items of personal property and
required that any claim be brought within one year of the discovery of
the loss ("suit clause").2' While in Florida, the plaintiff's property was
damaged by his wife.2 When the plaintiff submitted his claim, the
defendant denied coverage.3 Then, more than two years after
discovering the loss, the plaintiff brought a diversity action against the
insurance company in federal district court in Florida. 4 The insurer
defended on two grounds: (1) that the suit clause barred the claim;
and (2) that the policy did not cover losses resulting from willful
injury to the property caused by the plaintiff's wife.'
The case went to trial and the jury found for the plaintiff.26 The
defendant then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
relying in part on the suit clauseY The district court denied the
defendant's motion, apparently believing that a state statute rendered
the suit clause- ineffective.18 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
allowed for certification of questions of law within the British Empire and the Foreign
Law Ascertainment Act of 1861 allowed for certification of questions to foreign states).
16. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1998).
17. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 602-5(2) (1993).
18. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
19. IL at 212. One commentator has suggested that the Florida statute lay dormant
because the Florida Supreme Court did not adopt implementing rules. See Vincent L.
McKusick, Certification: A Procedure For Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts,
16 ME. L. REV. 33, 34 (1964). Another has suggested that the statute remained unused
because the Fifth Circuit either was unaware of it or apprehensive about using it. See John
R. Brown, Certification-Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L. REv. 455,457 (1977).
20. See Clay, 363 U.S. at 208.
21. See id.
22. See id. The plaintiff's wife stole some property from the plaintiff's home, burned
some of his clothing, and slashed a painting. See id. at 208, 209 n.1.
23. See id. at 208.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 208-09.
26. See id. at 209.
27. See id,
28. See id. The relevant Florida statute made illegal and void any contractual term
that fixed the time in which suits must be brought to a period less than that provided by
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due process would not permit Florida to apply its statute to the
Illinois-made contract.
29
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, criticizing
the Fifth Circuit for deciding the constitutional question before
determining the non-constitutional state law questions of whether the
Florida statute even applied to the contract at issue and whether the
losses were excluded because they had been caused by deliberate acts
of the plaintiff's wife.3 0 The Court continued, noting that while both
questions involved local law, the state court's determination on the
statutory question was controlling.31 Holding that a "confident guess"
could not be made as to how the Florida Supreme Court would
construe the statute, the Court praised the Florida legislature for its
"rare foresight" in adopting a certification procedure.3
In 1962, just two years after Clay, the Fifth Circuit, on its own
initiative, certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme
Court. In Green v. American Tobacco Co., 33 plaintiff Green claimed
that he had contracted lung cancer as a result of smoking defendant
American Tobacco Company's Lucky Strike cigarettes.' Green-
and after he died, his widow and his estate-asserted numerous
claims, including breach of implied warranty. The case went to trial
and the jury found for the defendant. 6 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
the issue presented was whether, under Florida law, the defendant
could be liable for Green's death on a breach of warranty theory.3 7
The Fifth Circuit answered the question in the negative. The
panel was divided, however, and on rehearing the court recognized
that there was no Florida law on point and certified the question to
the Florida Supreme Court. 9 On certification, the Florida Supreme
the state's statute of limitations. See ic- at 209 n.2. The relevant statute of limitations was
five years. See id.
29. See iL at 209.
30. See idL at 209-10.
31. See id at 212.
32. Id. On remand, the Fifth Circuit certified two questions to the Florida Supreme
Court: (1) whether the Florida statute applied to the insurance contract at issue; and (2)
whether, under the circumstances, the policy covered losses resulting from acts of
vandalism and theft committed by the insured's wife. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133
So. 2d 735, 737, 738-39 (Fla. 1961). The Florida Supreme Court answered both questions
in the affirmative. See icL at 738-39.
33. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
34. See iL at 71.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 72.
37. See id. at 86.
38. See id. at 76-77.
39. See id. at 86.
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Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the
defendant could be liable under Florida law.40 When the case came
back to federal court, the Fifth Circuit expressed great appreciation
to the Florida court for saving it "from committing serious error as to
the law of Florida which might have resulted in a grave miscarriage of
justice.
' 41
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court continued to take
advantage of available certification procedures.42 By the mid-1960s,
Maine and Washington joined Florida and Hawaii and adopted their
own certification statutes.43 In 1967, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act." Shortly thereafter, the American Law Institute voted to
incorporate a certification provision into its proposed revisions of the
United States Code.5
Certification received further recognition in 1974, when the
Supreme Court again praised the procedure. In Lehman Bros. v.
Schein,' shareholders sued a corporate fiduciary in federal district
court in New York, alleging that the fiduciary used inside information
for profit.47 The district court determined that Florida law governed
and mandated dismissal of the complaint.48 On appeal, the Second
Circuit agreed that Florida law governed but held that it allowed
40. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169,172 (Fla. 1963).
41. Green, 325 F.2d at 674 (citations omitted). After its experience in Green, the Fifth
Circuit continued to employ Florida's certification procedure. See, e.g., Life Ins. of Va.
Co. v. Shifflet, 370 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
42. See Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (per curiam) (employing
Florida's certification procedure); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963) (per curiam)
(same).
43. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (West Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.60.020 (West Supp. 1998). Maine's procedure was first put to use in 1966. See In re
Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966); Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966).
Washington's was not used until 1968. See In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968) (en
banc).
44. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF LAW AcT OF 1967, 12 U.L.A. 81 (1996). The
Uniform Law was revised in 1995. See 1995 UNIF. LAW, supra note 15. The provisions of
the 1995 Uniform Act are summarized infra note 57.
45. See AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICrION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371(e) (1969) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE]. The ALI proposal would have allowed a federal court to certify a question to
a state's highest court if: (1) the state had a certification procedure in place; (2) the state
law question "may be controlling" and could not "be satisfactorily determined in light of
the State authorities;" and (3) certification would not "cause undue delay or be prejudicial
to the parties." Id
46. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
47. See id. at 387-88.
48. See id. at 388-89.
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recovery.49 A lone dissenting judge challenged the majority's analysis
and argued that, because of the uncertainty of Florida law, the
question should have been certified. 0
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for the
Second Circuit to reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida
law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court.5 1 The Court
made clear that resorting to certification is not obligatory, even where
there is doubt as to state law and certification is available.52 It noted,
however, that "in the long run [certification] save[s] time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. '53 As for
the case at hand, the Court indicated that certification was
particularly appropriate given the Second Circuit's unfamiliarity with
Florida law.'
After Schein, numerous states jumped on the certification
bandwagon. Currently, the vast majority of states have adopted
certification procedures.5 5 In fact, North Carolina is one of only four
49. See id. at 389.
50. See id at 389-90.
51. See id. at 391-92.
52. See id. at 390-91.
53. Id. at 391.
54. See id. Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority decision in Schein, had been
critical of certification in Clay. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28
(1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
On remand, the Second Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme
Court. See Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453, 454 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (recounting the
procedural history of the case). The Florida Court held that under Florida law, the
plaintiffs' suit could not succeed. See id at 462. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed
the judgment below. See id. at 454.
55. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.02(b); ALA. R. APP. P. 18; ALASKA R. APP. P. 407;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1861 to 12-1867 (West 1994); ARIZ. S. CT. R. 27; CAL. R.
OF CT. 29.5; COLO. APP. R. 21.1; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West Supp. 1999);
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(9); DEL. S. Cr. R. 41; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723 (1981); D.C.
CT. APP. R. 54; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1998);
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-9 (1994); GA. S. Cr. R. 46-48; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 602-5(2) (1993); HAW. R. APP. P. 13; IDAHO APP. R. 12.1; ILL. S. CT. R. 20; IND.
CODE ANN. § 33-2-4-1 (Michie 1998); IND. R. APP. P. 15(0); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 684A.1-684A.11 (West 1998); IOWA R. APP. P. 451-461; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201
to 60-3212 (1994); KY. R. Crv. P. 76.37; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1999); LA. S. CT. R. XII; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (West Supp. 1998); ME.
R. Civ. P. 76B; MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JuD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to 12-613 (1998); MASS. S.
JuD. CT. R. 1.03; MIcH. CT. R. 7.305; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West 1990); MISS. R.
APP. P. 20; MONT. R. APP. P. 44; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-219 to 24-225 (1995); NEV. R.
APP. P. 5; N.H. S. Cr. R. 34; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-7-3 to 39-7-13 (Michie Supp. 1998);
N.M. R. APP. P. 12-607; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(9); N.Y. R. APP. Cr. § 500.17; N.D. R.
APP. P. 47; OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. XVIII; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1611 (West
Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.200-28.255 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. RULES
REGARDING CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW (1999); P.R. S. CT.
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states yet to enact the procedure. 6
Although many states have adopted the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act,57 there is some variation in the statutes
followed. With one exception, the only state courts empowered to
answer certified questions are courts of last resort.58 Almost all states
allow for certification from the United States Supreme Court or from
a federal court of appeals.59 Most states also permit questions to be
certified from federal district courts, as well as other federal courts.60
R. 27; R.I. S. CT. R. 6; S.C. APP. CT R. 228; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-24A-1 to 15-24A-
11 (Michie Supp. 1998); TENN. S. Cr. R. 23; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c; TEX. R. App. P.
110-114; VA. S. CT. R. 5:42; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.60.010-2.60.900 (West Supp.
1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 51-lA-1 to 51-1A-13 (Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 821.01-
821.12 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-13-104 to -107 (Michie 1997); WYo. R. APP. P.
11.
The Pennsylvania statute is unique in that it allows for certification "on a trial
basis" from January 1, 1999, to January 1, 2000. See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. RULES
REGARDING CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW (1999).
Although Utah adopted a certification procedure by court rule, the rule was found
to be unconstitutional and was withdrawn. See Holden v. N L Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428
(Utah 1981). Missouri's certification statute also was found to be unconstitutional. See
Zeman v. V. F. Factory Outlet, Inc., No. 72613 (Mo. July 13, 1990) (en banc)
(unpublished). For a discussion of the constitutionality of a North Carolina certification
procedure, see infra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
56. The three other states are Arkansas, New Jersey, and Vermont.
57. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT OF 1967, 12 U.L.A. 81
(1995) (table of jurisdictions where the act has been adopted); 1995 UNIF. Acr, supra note
15 (table of jurisdictions where the act has been adopted). The 1995 Uniform Act
provides that a state supreme court may answer a question certified by a federal court if
the answer "may be determinative of an issue in [the] ... litigation" and "there is no
controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of th[e] State." 1995
UNIF. Acr, supra note 15, at § 3. The Uniform Act allows the state's highest court to
reformulate the certified question, see id. § 4, requires that the state court notify the
certifying court whether it will entertain the certified question, see id. § 7, and directs that
the state court respond to an accepted question "as soon as practicable." Id. The Uniform
Act further provides that certification proceedings are governed by "the rules and statutes
governing briefs, arguments, and other appellate procedures," id. § 8, and that the high
court shall respond to the certified question by written order. See id. § 9.
58. Oklahoma vests the power to answer a certified question in the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. See OK. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 1602 (West Supp. 1999).
59. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(9) (allowing state's highest court to answer
questions certified from the United States Supreme Court or any United States Court of
Appeals). But see, e.g., ILL. S. Cr. R. 20(a) (allowing certification only by the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
60. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 684A.1 (West 1998) (allowing certification from the
United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, and a United States
District Court). A minority of states restrict certifications from federal district courts to
those sitting in the state. See IND. R. APP. P. 15(0) (allowing certification from, inter alia,
"any United States District Court sitting in Indiana"); TENN. S. Cr. R. 23(1) (allowing
certification from, inter. alia, "a District Court of the United States in Tennessee, or a
United States Bankruptcy Court in Tennessee").
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Some states also allow certification from courts of other states.61
In all jurisdictions, the power to answer the certified question is
discretionary, 62 and in many, the state court has the power to
reformulate the question if necessary.63 Typically, certification is
available only when the state law question is both unclear' and likely
to be determinative of the federal action.'
In most states, the certified question must be accompanied by
relevant findings of fact.66 A number of jurisdictions specifically
provide that briefing is either required 67 or permitted' and allow for
oral argument.69  A minority of states provide that when the
constitutionality of a state statute is at issue, the state must be notified
and either be allowed to intervene or permitted to participate as an
amicus curiae.70 At least one jurisdiction provides that its supreme
61. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 1994) (providing that the state supreme
court may answer questions certified from "the highest appellate court of any other
state"). Although state-to-state certification is permitted in a number of jurisdictions, it
reportedly never has been used. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional
Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 431 (1988) (finding no published
opinions in which state-to-state certification was employed).
62. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-106 (Michie 1997) ("The supreme court may
answer questions of law .... ") (emphasis added). Although the Washington statute uses
the word "shall," see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West Supp. 1998) ("the
supreme court shall render its opinion"), the Washington Supreme Court has held that
"[iun this field of legal inquiry the word 'shall' does not necessarily mean 'must,' but may
mean 'may.'" In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 352 (Wash. 1968) (en banc).
63. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 51-1A-4 (Supp. 1998) ("The supreme court of appeals of
West Virginia may reformulate a question certified to it.").
64. This requirement is formulated in a number of different ways. Compare WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-13-106 (Michie 1997) ("no controlling precedent in the existing decisions
of the supreme court"), with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 1994) ("no controlling
precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals of this state"),
and HAW. R. APP. P. 13(a) ("no clear controlling precedent in the Hawaii judicial
decisions").
65. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-106 (Michie 1997) (providing that supreme
court may answer questions certified from a federal court "which may be determinative of
the cause"). Other formulations of this requirement exist. See, e.g., IDAHO R. APP. P.
12.1(a)(1) (requiring the question to be a "controlling question of law in the pending
action"). For a discussion of interpretations of the "may be determinative" language, see
infra note 132 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., HAW. R. APP. P. 13 (requiring "a statement of facts showing the nature
of the cause"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.03 (West 1994) (requiring "[a] statement of all facts
relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose").
67. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18(g).
6& See, e.g., ARIZ. S. Cr. R. 27(d)(1).
69. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18(h).
70. See IOWA R. APP. P. 460 (providing that the state may participate as amicus
curiae); LA. S. Cr. R. XII § 8 (providing that the state may intervene); ME. R. CIV. P.
76B(f) (same); N.Y. R. APP. Cr. § 500.17(f) (providing that the state must be notified);
1999] 2131
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court must notify the certifying court and the parties within a
specified period of time as to whether the question will be accepted."
Another requires its high court to provide an expedited briefing and
hearing process?2 Several states provide that the state's highest court
must respond to the certified question "as soon as practicable." 73
Most jurisdictions require that the state's high court issue a written
opinion answering the certified question.74 Finally, some procedures
expressly provide that the state court's answer has res judicata effect
as to the parties75 and has the same precedential effect as any decision
of the court.
7 6
II. THE BENEFITS OF CERTIFICATION
Certification offers significant benefits, including avoiding
prognostication by the federal courts, promoting comity and
federalism, and providing a better alternative to abstention.
A. Avoiding Guesswork and Obtaining Authoritative, Correct
Answers to Questions of State Law
Federal courts deal with issues of state law in both diversity and
federal question cases. In the latter, state law issues may arise in
conjunction with the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or
in deciding the federal claim itself.7 In the former, Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins78 requires federal courts to apply state law when deciding
questions of substantive law.79
Where the relevant state law is clear, the process of applying that
law is not particularly problematic. State law, however, is often
unclear-either because the issue never has been addressed or, if it
has, because 'the controlling state decision is old or because
intervening trends have called the decision into question. 0
TEX. R. APP. P. 58.8 (providing that the state may intervene).
71. See S.C. R. App. P. 228(c) (setting a time limit of 45 days).
72. See NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-224 (Michie 1995).
73. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-8 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1997) (providing that the
state supreme court must "respond to an accepted certified question as soon as
practicable").
74. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE. § 51-1A-9 (Supp. 1998).
75. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(f); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061(7) (West 1990).
76. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(f).
77. For example, a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute may first
require interpretation and application of the statute.
78. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
79. See id. at 78-79.
80. See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1676 (1992).
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Uncertainty also results when the language in the controlling decision
is dictum or when less than a majority of the court joined the relevant
holding."'
The most difficult situations arise where there are no state court
decisions on point.82 When faced with such a situation, federal courts
must attempt to predict how the state's highest court would decide
the issue.83 This approach is a complex one, requiring the federal
judge to consider, among other things, the entire body of relevant
state law, any pertinent trends bearing on the particular issue before
him, treatises, restatements, law review articles or other materials that
he thinks the state court might find persuasive, as well as decisions
from other jurisdictions upon which the court might choose to rely.
84
Thus, it has been said that "the federal judge must often trade his
judicial robes for the garb of a prophet."'  Faced with an unclear
question of state law, Judge Friendly put it this way: "Our principal
task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought.
8 6
In applying the predictive approach, more than one court has
expressed skepticism that its prediction will be accurate. 87 In fact, the
evidence reveals that federal courts "get it wrong" in a significant
number of cases. Judge Sloviter of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has summarized some of the predictive
errors made by the federal courts in her circuit in interpreting
Pennsylvania law. She indicated that the federal courts "guessed
wrong" on questions regarding the breadth of the arbitration clauses
in automobile insurance policies, the availability of loss of consortium
damages for unmarried cohabitants, the "unreasonably dangerous"
81. See icL
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994)
("Where the substantive law of the forum state is uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the
federal courts is carefully to predict how the highest court of the forum state would resolve
the uncertainty or ambiguity.").
84. See Note, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 55 IOWA L. REV.
465,466-67 (1969).
85. Brown, supra note 19, at 455.
86. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S.
293 (1961).
87. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413
(11th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he task is less like applying a scientific formula and more like
painting a picture. We could take up the brush ourselves, but we are not at all confident
our painting would resemble the one the Alabama Supreme Court would have
produced.").
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standard in products liability cases, and the applicability of the
"discovery rule" to wrongful death and survival actions.8 Not
surprisingly, the federal courts in the Third Circuit are not the only
ones to have guessed erroneously. 9
The problem, of course, is that when a federal court "gets it
wrong," the litigants are denied the proper application of the law.
Also, until the erroneous decision is corrected, non-parties conform
their behavior to an improper legal norm.90 This problem persists if
there is a delay in the presentation of the issue to the state courts or
if, when finally presented with the issue, the lower state courts fail to
perceive the error in the federal decision and instead treat it as
applicable precedent.91
To the extent a schism develops between the federal court's
guess as to state law and the lower state court's determination on the
issue, the divergence may encourage forum shopping. 2 Parties who
find federal law more advantageous will sue in federal court or
remove to that forum; parties who prefer the state court law will opt
for that jurisdiction.
By ensuring that federal courts properly apply state law,
certification avoids the costs and inefficiencies associated with
incorrect federal decisionmaking. 93 Recognizing this, some federal
judges faced with applying unsettled questions of state law have
openly lamented the lack of a certification procedure.94 Others have
88. See Sloviter, supra note 80, at 1679-80.
89. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 455 n.2 (cataloging erroneous guesses made by
the Fifth Circuit); John D. Butzner, Jr. & Mary Nash Kelly, Certification: Assuring the
Primacy of State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449, 449 n.3 (1985)
(discussing one of the Fourth Circuit's wrong guesses).
90. See Wade H. McCree, Foreword, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 255,257 n.10 (1977) (noting
that the erroneous decision "frustrates the state's policy that would have allocated the
rights and duties differently").
91. See Sloviter, supra note 80, at 1681 ("[The erroneous federal decisions] may even
mislead lower state courts that may be inclined to accept federal predictions as applicable
precedent.").
92. See Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.)
("[A]ny substantial divergence between the federal court's estimate of state law and the
state's view of its own law will funnel all similar litigation to federal court.").
93. See id (Easterbrook, J.) ("Certification is an alternative to prognostication.").
Certification thus promotes the "twin aims" of Erie: discouraging forum shopping and
avoiding inequitable administration of the laws. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468
(1965).
94. See Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1987) ("We share the
regret expressed by the district judge that North Carolina has no certification
statute."). For other cases in the Fourth Circuit lamenting the absence of a North
Carolina certification procedure, see Luck v. GSSW Ltd. Partnership, No. 97-1578,
1997 WL 755409, at *2 fn. (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 1997) (per curiam) ("We would no doubt
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expressly advocated for the adoption of one.'
B. Promoting Comity and Federalism
When a federal court decides unsettled issues of state law, state
sovereignty is threatened. 6 If, in deciding such an issue, a federal
court applies different legal rules than the state court would have
applied, the federal court has effectively usurped the state court's
lawmaking function.97 And when federal courts decide unsettled
questions of state law in cases involving policy judgments with
widespread impact, the intrusion on state sovereignty is at its
greatest.9 Although in theory this intrusion is temporary, lasting only
until the state's high court corrects the erroneous federal decision, it
may have a more enduring effect when the issue is not presented to
the state courts for some time. This could happen for a number of
reasons, such as when advantageous law in the federal system
encourages litigants to "forum shop," thus delaying presentation of
the state law issue to the state courts.99
In a federal system, questions of law that are local and important
certify the state law question presented here to the North Carolina Supreme Court if
there was a procedure available to do that."); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burton, 599 F.
Supp. 1313, 1316 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 1984) ("Presently there is no procedure available for
certifying controlling questions of unsettled state law to the North Carolina Supreme
Court. This case presents a persuasive argument for adoption of such a procedure.").
Judges in other jurisdictions without certification procedures have expressed similar
sentiments. See, e.g., School Employees Credit Union v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., Nos. 93-3402, 94-3008, 1995 WL 231370, at *2 n.3 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995) ("It is
unfortunate indeed that Arkansas lacks a certification procedure.").
95. See Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Becker, J., dissenting) ("This case is its own best evidence, as the majority observes, of
the utility of a certification procedure; I respectfully urge New Jersey to adopt one."); Gill
v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 434 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1970) (advocating adoption of a
certification procedure in Arkansas).
96. As one federal judge stated: "When federal judges make state law-and we do,
by whatever euphemism one chooses to call it-judges who are not selected under the
state's system and who are not answerable to its constituency are undertaking an inherent
state court function." Sloviter, supra note 80, at 1687.
97. See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 577 N.E.2d 1077,1080 (Ohio 1991).
98. Cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("Having the most authoritative voice on Alabama law decide the state law
issues in this case is especially important because the decision will affect the rights of so
many of the state's citizens, perhaps more than half."); Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm.,
55 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1995) (acknowledging reluctance "to burden the Court with
certification, and the litigants with the attendant delay, were we not convinced that the
statutory question is of sufficient and prospective importance to state policy in the
administration of its school system, and affects students and school administrators
statewide for us to make a far-reaching decision without advice").
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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to a wide spectrum of state government activities should be decided
in the first instance by state courts.100 In Younger v. Harris,10 the
Supreme Court explained that the notion of comity encompasses "a
proper respect for state functions" and "a recognition of the fact that
... the National Government will fare best if the States ... are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."''
2
The Court continued, noting that this concept, also referred to as
"Our Federalism," contemplates a system in which the federal
government is sensitive to the legitimate interests of the states and
endeavors to act in ways that will not "unduly interfere" with state
activities. 3 By providing a means for federal courts to afford states
the opportunity to authoritatively declare their own law, certification
"helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.""
C. Fostering Judicial Economy by Avoiding the Costs and Delay
Associated with Abstention
Abstention doctrines permit a federal court to decline to hear a
case where all of the jurisdictional requirements have been met.05
Abstention was first applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.106 In that case, the
Supreme Court articulated what has come to be known as "Pullman
abstention." Under Pullman abstention, where resolution of
unsettled questions of state law may obviate the need for a federal
court to decide a federal constitutional question, the federal court
should abstain until the state court has resolved the state law issue.Y
7
Since Pullman, the Supreme Court has developed other abstention
100. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647,663 n.16 (1978).
101. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
102. lId at 44.
103. Id.
104. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). In considering whether to
answer certified questions, one state court explained that:
[A]part from a most fundamental principle of "our federalism"-that the state
court of last resort is alone the supreme arbiter of the substantive content of the
law of the State-a concern to promote federal-state comity would counsel that,
wherever reasonably possible, the state court of last resort should be given
opportunity to decide state law issues on which there are no state precedents
which are controlling or clearly indicative of the developmental course of the
state law.
White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 675 (Me. 1974) (footnote omitted).
105. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 122, at 122-1 (3d
ed. 1997).
106. 312 U.S. 496,501 (1941).
107. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACnICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4241, at 8 (2d ed. 1988).
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doctrines, 08 including "Thibodaux abstention."'19 Under Thibodaux
abstention, a federal court may abstain in a diversity case if the
litigation includes an unresolved question of state law on an issue
intimately involved with the sovereign prerogative of the state."0
When either Pullman or Thibodaux abstention is employed, the
parties must initiate a separate lawsuit in the state trial court. By the
time the state action progresses from trial to appellate court, the costs
and delay are significant. Additionally, before the litigants even
initiate suit in state court, there may be a full round of appeals
challenging the federal district court's decision to abstain."'
Certification achieves the same goal as Pullman and Thibodaux
abstention: obtaining an authoritative answer from the state court on
a difficult question of state law. But by allowing the unclear question
to be presented directly to the state's highest court, certification
mitigates the costs and delay associated with abstention and,
therefore, offers a better option for the courts and the litigants."2
III. ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO CERTIFICATION
The three most significant objections to certification are the
unconstitutionality of the procedure,"3 the additional cost and delay it
108. See generally 17 MOORE, supra note 105, §§ 122.02-122.06 (describing the
development of abstention doctrine).
109. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
110. See icL at 28.
111. See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 & n.2 (1962)
(per curiam).
112. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (noting that
certification, as compared to abstention, reduces the delay, cuts the cost, and increases the
likelihood of an "authoritative response"); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470
(1987) (noting that certification reduces "the substantial burdens of cost and delay that
abstention places on litigants").
Because the other abstention doctrines allow a federal court to decline to exercise
jurisdiction for reasons other than unclear questions of state law, certification does not
provide a procedural alternative where those doctrines are applied. Under the Burford
abstention, for example, federal courts abstain to defer to comprehensive state
administrative procedures. See 17 MOORE, supra note 105, § 122.04[1]. Certifying a
question to the state's highest court would not serve this objective. See generally id.
§§ 122.05-122.06 (discussing the purposes of Younger and Colorado River abstention).
113. Constitutional objections to certification procedures have been raised by litigants,
see In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 828 (Me. 1966) (challenging the certification proceeding
on the grounds that it violated the Maine constitution); Holden v. N L Indus., Inc., 629
P.2d 428, 429, 431 (Utah 1981) (noting that defendant filed a motion in opposition to
acceptance of certification and argued that the procedure was unconstitutional), and by
state supreme court judges. See, e.g., Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735,739 (Fla.
1961) (raising sua sponte the constitutional question of its jurisdiction to answer certified
questions); In re Certified Question, 443 N.W.2d 112, 123 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J., separate
opinion) (noting that the court was not asked to consider whether the certification
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imposes on the parties,"4 and the potential to inundate an already
overburdened state court system with additional cases." 5 None of
these objections should forestall adoption of a certification procedure
in North Carolina.
A. Constitutionality
The principal constitutional issues concerning certification
procedures have been: (1) whether they run afoul of constitutional
requirements that the state supreme court not render advisory
opinions or rule on abstract questions;1 6 and (2) whether they are
prohibited by specific constitutional limitations on the state court's
jurisdiction."7 The majority of state courts that have addressed these
possible constitutional flaws have found them to be without merit.1 18
For the reasons discussed below, these issues pose no barrier to
implementation of a certification procedure in North Carolina.
1. Advisory Opinions and Abstract Questions
Article IV, section 12 of the North Carolina Constitution deals
with the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Supreme Court. It
provides that the supreme court "shall have jurisdiction to review
upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law
or legal inference" and "may issue any remedial writs necessary to
procedure was constitutional but addressing that question nevertheless). Legislators have
also raised constitutional issues when contemplating enactment of certification
procedures. See Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A
Proposal for Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127, 174-75 (1992) (noting that Connecticut legislators
raised the question of constitutionality when considering a certification procedure for that
state).
114. Concerns regarding the additional costs and delay associated with certification
have been voiced by judges, see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1960)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 224 (Black, J., dissenting); Holden, 629 P.2d at 431 n.13,
commentators, see Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical
Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717, 725-27 (1969)
(presenting the delay associated with certification as part of "the case against
certification"); Larry M. Roth, Certifying Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and
Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) (suggesting that the delay associated with
certification "threaten[s] its use and effectiveness"), and legislators, see Robbins, supra
note 113, at 175 (noting that Connecticut legislators were concerned with unreasonable
delay in case resolution).
115. Concerns with overburdening state court systems also have cropped up
throughout the years. See Holden, 629 P.2d at 431 n.13 (noting the issue of crowded
dockets); Robbins, supra note 113, at 137 (noting "prevalent fear of inundation").
116. See Gerald M. Levin, Note, Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention
Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344,350 (1963).
117. See Holden, 629 P.2d at 428.
118. See infra notes 121-28,137-40 and accompanying text.
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give it general supervision and control over the proceedings of the
other courts.""' 9 The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted
the state constitution to prohibit it from rendering advisory opinions
or ruling on abstract questions. 2 The decisions of other state
supreme courts addressing these issues reveal that careful drafting
can obviate any problems that they may pose.
In In re Richards, the Maine Supreme Court rejected the
contention that questions presented to it under the state's
certification procedure amounted to requests for advisory opinions.' 2'
Noting that the parties are before the court and are given the
opportunity to present briefs and oral arguments, the court concluded
that it is clear that there is a genuine live controversy pending in the
federal court which will be determined its response."z The court
noted that its response would be like a declaratory judgment and
would have res judicata and stare decisis effect.'23 Notwithstanding
this conclusion, however, the Richards court reluctantly declined to
answer the certified question before it on grounds that operative facts
remained unresolved. The court explained that in order to avoid
rendering advisory opinions, its response to a certified question also
must be "determinative of the cause,"'2 4 a requirement that could not.
be met where, as in the case before it, material facts were in
dispute."25
Citing In re Richards, the Washington Supreme Court held that
certified questions were not requests for advisory opinions and did
not involve abstract questions.26  Following the reasoning of
Richards, the Washington court concluded that certification
proceedings involve actual controversies in which there are no
disputed facts and result in judgments that have res judicata and stare
119. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1).
120. See In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890,891 (N.C. 1985) ("The North Carolina
Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory
opinions."); Boswell v. Boswell, 241 N.C. 515,519, 85 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1955) ("[This] court
will not give advisory opinions or decide abstract questions."). The supreme court has
stated that individual members have given advisory opinions occasionally "as a matter of
courtesy, and out of respect to a coordinate branch of the government." In re Advisory
Opinion, 335 S.E. 2d at 891 (quotation omitted). The court has cautioned, however, that
under the constitution, these opinions "can only [] be opinions of individual members of
the Court and not the Court itself," and as such do not have the force of law. Id.
(quotation omitted).
121. 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
122. See id. at 832.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 833. In fact, the Maine certification statute so required. See id.
125. See id.
126. See In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (Wash. 1968) (en banc).
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decisis effect. 27  Other state courts have reached similar
conclusions.2 8
Thus, the existing case law suggests that a certification procedure
will not conflict with a constitutional prohibition on answering
abstract questions or rendering advisory opinions if: (1) there is an
actual controversy between the parties;129 (2) the state court decision
will serve as the law of the case and qualify as a res judicata and stare
decisis adjudication of the state rights involved;1" (3) the relevant
facts have been stipulated or decided;13' and (4) the state court's
answer will resolve an issue in the case.32 These requirements easily
127. See id. at 354. In In re Elliot, the Washington court went on to hold in the
alternative that it had the authority to render advisory opinions. See id. at 355.
128. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980)
(holding that the certified question presented "neither violates the case or controversy
requirement nor the separation of powers doctrine on advisory opinions"); Wolner v.
Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting a party's argument that
the court's prior decision responding to a certified question was advisory and not binding
precedent).
129. This prerequisite could be satisfied simply by requiring that certifications only be
made from cases "pending" in the federal system. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
(articulating the case or controversy requirement).
130. Some states have expressly drafted this requirement into their certification
statutes. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
131. Although this requirement is probably best seen as addressing the issue of
abstractness, see Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of
Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 888, 901 (1971) ("[T]o the extent that
the state court requires findings by the federal court before it will make a determination, it
cannot plausibly be argued that the state court is presented with a question of law devoid
of a concrete factual setting."), some courts have viewed it as resolving the advisory
opinion issue. See Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989) (per curiam) (noting
that the court will avoid rendering an advisory opinion on a certified question "if the
certification of facts and the record contain the necessary factual predicates to our
resolution of the question certified, and it is clear that evidence admissible at trial may be
resolved in a manner requiring application of the law in question"). The third
requirement is satisfied if the procedure permits certification only from appellate courts.
See In re Richards, 223 A.2d at 833.
132. This requirement ensures that the state court is not engaging in a superfluous
exercise. Many certification statutes require that the answer to the certified question "be
determinative of the cause" but most courts interpret such language liberally, requiring
only that the certified question resolve an issue in the pending litigation. See, e.g.,
Schlieter, 775 P.2d at 710 (noting that an answer to certified question will not constitute an
advisory opinion if the answer is "determinative in that it resolves the issue in the case ...
and the resolution of this issue materially advances the ultimate termination of the
litigation"); Western Helicopter Servs. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630 (Or.
1991) ("The ... requirement ... that the question must be one whose answer may
determine the cause, means that our decision must ... have the potential to determine at
least one claim in the case."). At least one court, however, has interpreted the
"determinative of the cause" language narrowly, requiring that its decision be
determinative of the claim. See Matter of Certified Question from U.S. Dist. Ct., 549 P.2d
1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976). In other words, all that can be left for the certifying court to do is
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could be drafted into a certification procedure for North Carolina.133
2. Constitutional Limits on Jurisdiction
The North Carolina Constitution, like state constitutions
generally, acts as a limitation on power, not a grant of power. 34 As
the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated: "All power which is
not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains
with the people, and an act of the people through their
representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that
Constitution.' 1 35 If there is any doubt as to the legislature's power to
act in any particular situation, the court has stated that the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the legislative action.'36
Relying on these principles, high courts in other jurisdictions
have upheld the constitutionality of their states' certification
procedures. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay,37 the Florida
Supreme Court considered whether the state's certification procedure
violated a provision in the Florida Constitution delineating the
appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court and providing for the
court's issuance of certain named writs. Because the named writs did
not cover certification, the constitutionality of the certification statute
hinged on whether the constitutional provision was a grant of or
limitation on judicial power. 38 The court upheld the statute, stating:
[I]n the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by
necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to those matters expressly conferred upon it,
and in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly
conferring upon another court jurisdiction to exercise the
judicial power which is the subject matter of [the
certification procedure], and in the light of the well settled
to enter judgment consistent with the answer to the certified question. See id Such a view
strips the certification procedure of any real utility, see 17A WRIGHT, supra note 107,
§ 4248, at 169, and has been rejected by the Uniform Law drafters. See 1995 UNIF. Acr,
supra note 15, § 2 (providing for certification of questions that "may be determinative of
an issue in the pending litigation").
133. See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 131, at 904 ("The problem of advisory opinions,
like the problem of abstractness, can be solved by careful drafting.").
134. See Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 337, 410 S.E.2d 887, 891 (1991); McIntyre v.
Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510,514,119 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1961).
135. Baker, 330 N.C. at 336-37, 410 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting State ex rel. Martin v.
Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989)).
136. See id. at 338,410 S.E.2d at 891.
137. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961); see supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text
(discussing prior federal court history of this case).
138. See Clay, 133 So. 2d at 741.
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rule that all sovereign power, including the judicial power,
not limited by a state constitution inheres to the people of
the state, such power may be granted to this court by statute
if it is deemed to be a substantive matter, or by a rule of this
court if it is deemed to be a matter of practice and
procedure. 39
Other high courts have followed Clay and have upheld the
constitutionality of their states' certification procedures. 141
By contrast, in Holden v. N L Industries, Inc.,4' the Utah
Supreme Court reluctantly held its certification rule unconstitutional
because of an express limitation on the supreme court's jurisdiction
contained in the state constitution. 42 The relevant portion of the
Utah Constitution gave the state supreme court original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
habeas corpus and "'[i]n other cases ... appellate jurisdiction
only.' "143
The Holden court began by noting that since the named writs did
not include certification, the supreme court had no original
jurisdiction to answer certified questions. 4 The court then turned to
the "'[i]n other cases ... appellate jurisdiction only' " clause and
concluded that an answer to a certified question was not an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction.45 The court reasoned that, as used in the
Utah Constitution, the term "appellate jurisdiction" connotes review
of actions by courts subordinate to the state supreme court, a
description inapplicable to the federal courts.146 The court noted that
comparable provisions in most state constitutions omit the word
"only," thus making the constitutional conferral of appellate
jurisdiction amenable to the construction that the high court's
jurisdiction could be enlarged by an exercise of legislative or judicial
power. It held, however, that the presence of that word in the Utah
Constitution precluded such a construction and required that the
139. Id. at 742-43 (quotations omitted).
140. See In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 350-52 (Wash. 1968) (en banc) (following Clay);
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Idaho 1983)
(following In re Elliot and Clay).
141. 629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981).
142. See id. at 430. Notwithstanding its holding that the state's certification rule was
unconstitutional, the Holden court described certification as "a commendable effort to
further the interest of justice through cooperative efforts by state and federal courts." Id
at 431.
143. Id at 430 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4).
144. See id.




certification rule be found unconstitutional.147
The North Carolina Constitution does not contain a
jurisdictional limitation such as that addressed in Holden.148 Because
of this fact and because all sovereign power not limited by the state
constitution remains with the people, there is no constitutional
impediment to the legislature's adoption of a certification
procedure. 49
B. Undue Delay and Excessive Cost
Another objection leveled at certification procedures is that they
produce undue delay. 51 Justice Black first articulated this concern in
his Clay dissent, arguing that "[1litigants ... have a right to have their
lawsuits decided without unreasonable and unnecessary delay or
expense.' 5' Justice Douglas, also dissenting, argued against the
147. See id. at 430-32. At one time, Alabama's constitution paralleled Utah's, granting
its supreme court "appellate jurisdiction only." ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VI. In 1973,
that provision was amended, authorizing the Alabama Supreme Court to answer
"questions of state law certified by a court of the United States." ALA. CONST. art. VI,
amend. 328. After the 1973 amendment, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted a
certification procedure by court rule. See ALA. R. APP. P. 18. A constitutional
amendment was also thought necessary before New York could adopt a certification
procedure. See Robbins, supra note 113, at 167-68 (describing the proposal and adoption
of a certification procedure in New York).
148. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (quoting relevant portion of North
Carolina Constitution).
149. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742-43 (Fla. 1961). In addressing
the constitutionality of their certification procedures, two state supreme courts have held
that answering certified questions is not an exercise of jurisdiction. The Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned: "'Jurisdiction' means the power to hear and determine a cause. By
answering a state-law question certified by a federal court, we may affect the outcome of
the federal litigation, but the federal court still hears and decides the cause." Scott v.
Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (quotation and citation
omitted); see also Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers, 826 P.2d 603, 606 n.4 (Okla. 1992)
(holding that answering certified questions is not an exercise of jurisdiction). Considering
the status that must be given to answers to certified questions-res judicata and stare
decisis-in order to avoid problems related to abstractness and advisory opinions, these
decisions seem unsound.
Although the North Carolina Constitution does not contain a specific limitation
prohibiting certification, it does contain a provision indicating that the actual certification
procedure (as distinguished from a legislative provision authorizing the court to accept
certified questions) could be adopted only by court rule. Article IV, section 13 of the
North Carolina Constitution provides, in relevant part: "The Supreme Court shall have
exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division."
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2). By vesting the North Carolina Supreme Court with
exclusive authority to make procedural rules for the Appellate Division, this section
requires that the certification procedure be adopted by court rule, a method not without
precedent. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 114 (citing instances where this concern has been raised).
151. Cay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 363 U.S. 207,224 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
2143
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"practice of making litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to
obtain justice."'152
The use of certification in Clay resulted in significant delay-four
years elapsed from the United States Supreme Court's initial decision
extolling certification 53 to the case's final adjudication in federal
court with the aid of the Florida Supreme Court's answers to the
certified questionsY54 Clay, however, does not represent the typical
certification experience. Clay was the first case handled under an
inter-jurisdictional certification procedure; - this circumstance alone
likely accounts for a significant portion of the delay. In fact, the
Florida Supreme Court did not have in place court rules
implementing the certification statute and had to adopt such rules
before the process could move forward.55
Although there is not a large body of empirical evidence on
point, the available evidence suggests that certification does not
produce delays commensurate with those experienced in Clay. A
Federal Judicial Center study of forty-eight cases in which
certification was used found a median time of only 6.36 months from
certification to obtaining the state court's answer, with a range of less
than one month to two and a half years. 6 The study pointed out that
these calculations of delay were overstated because a true measure
would subtract out the time the federal court would need to research
and reach its own answer to the state law question.'7 The study also
found that although cases involving questions of state law require
more time from filing to disposition than more typical cases, only a
relatively small proportion of that time is directly attributable to use
of the certification procedure. 58 Finally, the study noted that any
delay should decrease with greater experience in the certification
process. 59
Similarly, in a survey of six clerks of state high courts, four
indicated that the answering court required only three to six months
152. Id. at 227 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 207.
154. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). Citing the delay in Clay, one
commentator suggested that the case is "another dim chapter in the ... history of
certification." Mattis, supra note 114, at 726.
155. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, supra note 45, § 1371 (e), at 293.
156. See CARROLL SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE
OF FEDERAL JUDGES 15-16 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1983).
157. See id. at 16.
158. See id. at 16-17.
159. See id. at 17.
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to dispose of certified questions."6  One clerk indicated that the
relevant time period was six to nine months.161 Another indicated
that it was nine to twelve months. 62 This evidence suggests that the
delay (and the accompanying cost) associated with certification is not
unmanageable. In any event, whatever the delay associated with
certification, where the alternative is abstention, certification results
in a quicker and cheaper resolution of the litigation 60
Finally, "good adjudication in difficult cases is not likely to be
quick or cheap."'164 As one judge queried: "[A]bout the only virtue
an immediate decision has is that it is done. It is done now and delay
is avoided. Delay, to be sure, is a thing we all strive to avoid and
overcome. But what else is served?"'65
The judicial system should endeavor to reduce cost and delay
where possible. With regard to certification, however, the available
evidence indicates that the benefits of the process outweigh the
additional cost and delay that it creates. 66 At most, concerns
regarding cost and delay support the argument that certification
should be used wisely, not denied altogether. 67
C. Burden on State Courts
Finally, certification proposals have been met with concern that
federal courts will be quick to employ the procedure and that the
resulting flood of cases will inundate and overburden the state's
highest court. 6' The federal courts, however, do not employ
certification lightly. As the Supreme Court has noted with regard to
abstention, mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for
remitting the parties to a state tribunal.69 Importing this notion into
the certification context, the Fifth Circuit has stated that it "use[s]
much judgment, restraint, and discretion in certifying" and "[will] not
160. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 61, at 453.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
164. Corr & Robbins, supra note 61, at 430.
165. W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1967)
(Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part), rev'dper curiam, 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
166. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 61, at 430; see also SERON, supra note 156, at 17
("Overall, the findings suggest that the extra time taken by certification does not outweigh
the benefits of the procedure.").
167. See Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Becker, J., dissenting).
168. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
169. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,234-38 (1943).
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abdicate.' 17°
Those states that have adopted certification procedures have not
reported excessive numbers of certifications. 7  In Florida, for
example, the state with the longest history of certification, the
number of cases certified to the Florida Supreme Court in any one
year for the 1990 to 1997 period ranged from one to ten, with an
average of 4.875 cases per year.172 Moreover, a survey of six state
high court clerks indicated that certification increased the highest
courts' caseload by less than five percent a year.173
Finally, and most significantly, if the certification procedure
provides that the high court's decision to accept the question is
discretionary, that court will always have a means to control its
caseload should the number of certifications exceed expectations. 4
CONCLUSION
Inter-jurisdictional certification is not a novel procedure; it has
been used in other jurisdictions for close to forty years and is in place
in all but four states. Time and experience prove that concerns
regarding delay, cost, and overburdening the state courts are either
unfounded or exaggerated. Moreover, existing case law reveals that
any constitutional objections that may be raised with regard to a
North Carolina certification procedure can be addressed by careful
drafting. Certification offers significant benefits, including avoiding
prognostication by the federal courts, obtaining correct answers to
questions of state law, and promoting comity, federalism, and judicial
economy. These benefits accrue to the litigants in the case employing
the certification option, to the state and federal court systems, and to
170. Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir.
1975); see also Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 958 F.2d
622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (observing that certification "is a valuable resource
... so we dare not abuse it by over use lest we wear out our welcome").
171. See Robbins, supra note 113, at 137 ("None of the forty jurisdictions with
certification procedures has reported being overburdened by the number of certified
questions, despite prevalent fear of inundation.").
172. See Telephone Interview with Debbie Causseaux, Chief Deputy, Clerk of the
Florida Supreme Court (Feb. 12, 1998). More specifically, the number of certified cases in
Florida over the last eight years is as follows: 1990 (3); 1991 (6); 1992 (5); 1993 (10); 1994
(3); 1995 (1); 1996 (5); and 1997 (6). See id.
173. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 61, at 452.
174. See Robbins, supra note 113, at 137 ("[A]s a practical matter that court completely
controls its docket and may reject certified-question cases if the number becomes
overwhelming.").
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the larger community affected by court decisionmaking. For these
reasons, inter-jurisdictional certification is long overdue in North
Carolina.
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